Studying 'history-in-action'
Introduction
Business historians work with all kinds of empirical materials to piece together the history of an industry, business system or organization: company archives, publicly-available archives, records of interviews, financial records, journalistic coverage, biographies, legal documents, governmental records, popular business books or magazines of the time, and so on. Business history enables us to use knowledge of the past to inform and educate scholars, students, business practitioners, policy-makers and the wider public about what happened and whyand perhaps even shape the future through this knowledge of the past. Thanks to the scholarship within the field, we now have a rich understanding of major historical events and trends which have shaped the business world of today, such as the Wall Street Crash, the divorce between control and ownership in large corporations and bank-industry relations. 1 In recent years, the field has seen a series of calls for more engagement with the broader social science disciplines, including management and organization studies, 2 in an attempt to persuade business historians to move beyond descriptive case studies or industry analyses that simply present a chronology of events. For de Jong, Higgins and Driel, 3 business history needs to become a social science: wherein hypotheses can be tested, and rejected or refined, against objective empirical evidence. Business historians could, in their view, become like natural scientists, alike in methodology except for the fact that their 'objects of analysis' are not natural phenomena but social, cultural and political systems. Business history, for them,
should not simply seek to describe what happened, but create general theories which can explain it, in the same way that physicists may use, say, the theory of gravity to predict the movement of objects in space.
This plea to develop business history as a positive science certainly mirrors the trend towards viewing business and management studies more generally as a budding, if somewhat underdeveloped, "science" that gains its value and legitimacy from its ability to generate reliable, objective and generalizable theories and models to explain how businesses and business systems work. A cursory glance over the leading international journals in business and management studies will also reveal the dominance of this positivistic logic in published research, with articles littered with variables, correlations and hypotheses. In this paper, we seek to lay out an alternative research agenda for the field of business history, grounded in ethnomethodology's alternative theoretical vision. Ethnomethodology -as we will go on to outline -seeks nothing short of a 'radical re-specification' of the human sciences 4 , and offers what we believe to be a rich source of theoretical insight for the development of new empirical and methodological perspectives in the field of business history.
The paper is structured as follows. We first outline what ethnomethodology is, its relationship to mainstream social science and, following Lynch 5 , what an ethnomethodological approach to studying 'history-in-action' involves. Next, we outline how ethnomethodological history 6 differs from other approaches, drawing on illustrative excerpts from Lynch and Bogen's seminal book The Spectacle of History. In the main body of the paper, we lay out three distinct but related research directions for developing an ethnomethodological business history: (1) studying how historical events are recorded, (2) studying how versions of the past are assembled and used for practical reasoning and decision-making, and (3) opportunities for new forms of reflective practice and reflective methodology. We conclude by situating this research agenda within the field of business history and its implications for research methodology and theory development.
What is ethnomethodology? ... And what can it offer business history?
The field of ethnomethodology was founded by the work of Harold Garfinkel, an American sociologist, in the 1960s. Ethnomethodology is the study of the practical methods through which members of a particular social group accomplish social organization and generate social order. The term can usefully be broken down:
"ethno" = a social or cultural group, whether as small as a family business or as large as an entire nation-state;
"methodology" = the methods or procedures that competent members of that group use to go about their social life (such as the 'methods' used to form an orderly queue);
Ethnomethodology has been used to study a wide range of different social groups and settings, from classic early studies of coroners tasked with deciding the cause of death when presented with a dead body, 7 case-workers in a welfare agency, 8 to scientists at work in a laboratory. 9 Any -and indeed all -social practices can be studied, not just complex, professional or 'expert' settings such as these. Even apparently simple everyday actions such as crossing the road or forming a queue rely on member's use of 'ethno-methods' to make them happen and keep them 'orderly'. 10 Ethnomethodology stands apart from its 'home' discipline of sociology in that it seeks to provide an alternative to mainstream functionalist sociology, specifically its assumptions about the social structures, facts and variables that are presumed to create social order. This applies both to the so-called 'macro' social order of the 'rules', 'norms' and 'values' purported to emanate from institutions such as the State, the family, the education system and religion, which are understood to govern society writ-large, and the so-called 'micro' social order of, say, a small number of people forming an orderly queue. Ethnomethodology addresses the same 'problem' or 'topic' as sociology -how social order is generated or transformed -but 'turns it on its head'. Rather than seeing people as 'judgemental dopes' or 'dupes' who are 'pushed and pulled' by social facts -such as a social rule, norm, or value -it views social order as the on-going, artful and knowledgeable accomplishment of members.
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Functionalist approaches start with the premise that social facts exist as "objective facts" that have the same epistemological status as the facts and laws that natural scientists work with, then use them as an explanatory resource to explain how society 'functions' -as per the hypotheses about causal mechanisms that explain history sought by de Jong, Higgins and Driel's vision for business history. Ethnomethodologists, on the other hand, treat social facts as a topic of study. People are understood to employ their stock of social knowledge and reasoning procedures to produce the very 'social facts' that other sociological approaches treat as unproblematic.
Lynch and Bogen set out the analytical programme for an ethnomethodological perspective on history as follows:
"If one assumes that no objective or historical knowledge can ever be "unconstructed", then to say that something held out to be a fact really is a social construction does not imply that the fact should be dismissed as an illusion or condemned as a product of political machinations ... We are more interested in the infrastructure of that construction, the practical methods through which the event was assembled, contested and stabilised." 12 Two important notes are necessary here. First, this emphasis on the 'knowledge-ability' of actors must not be confused with claiming that members are always conscious of these ethnomethods. In fact, a central project of ethnomethodology is to explicate and document the typically taken-for-granted ethno-methods used by members. Hence, many insights can be gained from revealing the often taken-for-granted and typically un-explicated methods through which histories are compiled from diverse sources of evidence. Second, this emphasis on the 'ongoing' and 'artful' accomplishment of social organization does not mean that 'anything goes': that any version of history will be accepted or ratified by others. Quite the contrary, ethnomethodology is centrally concerned with the more or less institutionalised and systematically unequal opportunities and rights of different social actors to produce accounts and have them accepted by others. 13 To paraphrase Mehan: while everyone presents their version of history as real, powerful people's versions are real for everyone in their consequences.
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Making Sense of Historical Events
How do historians make sense of historical evidence? How does this process of 'reading'
inform the historical accounts they produce? As Tosh points out, sensemaking is a fundamental component of history, as historians attempt to not only describe but also interpret the past 15 . Box 1 provides an illustration of the equivocality of the kinds of historical evidence (oral testimony and documents) in Lynch and Bogen's analysis of the now infamous Iran-Contra affair of 1985-1987.
---Insert Box 1 here ---
Taking Sides
Several analytical avenues are opened up when historians examine evidence such as that provided in Box 1. The first is to 'take sides': to explicitly (or implicitly) accept one party's version and 'ratify' it as the correct version, to be written into the historian's version of Lynch and Bogen put it thus: "we want to investigate how the parties to the testimony employed the distinction between truth and lying, and how they articulated the opposition between politics and value neutrality". ... Consequently, deconstruction does not identify our own methodological agenda, but it is instead a perspicuous feature of the struggle we describe." Historians therefore work by collecting together records, sequencing them and judging them (e.g. as factual or fictional), with a view to their inclusion in a developing narrative. The job of the ethnomethodological historian, then, is not to decide on the most compelling narrative, or to produce their own narrative, or to avoid the 'pitfall' of the fiction-genre by producing a more 'objective' account. Rather, it is to study how chronologies are pieced together into a meaningful and coherent narrative, how certain chronologies are ratified as 'factual', and how others are written off as 'speculation', 'spin' or 'spoof'. As such, ethnomethodology contributes to the questions laid out by Hansen concerning how certain narratives come to dominate and how the sensemaking process stabilizes around certain versions of events 33 .
Lynch puts it as follows: "... the fact that the historian or sociologist faces a daunting task when trying to use documentary collections to reconstruct systematic and coherent temporal or organizational patterns, becomes less interesting than the constitutive work of assembling documentary materials into coherent historical accounts." 34 Business histories, such as the analysis of the pepper scandal produced by Cox 35 , also rely on the production of chronologies of events involving the movement of people, money, information, and so on. Treasury's desire to avoid political "embarrassment", given their concern about the political implications of the deal in relation to the mounting war debt 36 . The point is not that Cox is wrong to sequence events in that way, or attribute events to particular personal, political or financial motives. The aim is not to produce a different sequence, or supplant this explanation with a different set of motives and causal mechanisms. The aim of an ethnomethodological history is to enrich our understanding of how the social facts used by Cox to produce his explanation were produced.
A final note is relevant here. Analysing which version is believed and which version prevails does not mean that the historian is expected to 'get inside the minds' of those tasked with assembling official histories. Nor are historians asked to judge whether they themselves trust 
An Ethnomethodological Research Agenda
What, then, does adopting an ethnomethodological approach to business history offer to the field? In this section, we outline a future research agenda for business history that addresses three research questions: how archives and records are compiled; how versions of the past are assembled; and how historians can learn from explicating their own historical ethno-methods.
Archives and records
Ethnomethodology treats any collection of records, however disparate, accidental or deliberately assembled, as products of the ethno-methods of the social groups who created and subsequently collected, organized and used them. This opens up some interesting avenues for business history. Two key insights and research directions will be considered here: studying members' ethno-methods for categorising, classifying and recording; and studying the meaning of the presence or absence of records themselves.
First, a fruitful line of research can be directed to studying members' practices for creating because no records were kept. Other documents which did exist -particularly ones that were thought to threaten the preferred world-view of those in power in particular -are destroyed or edited. Some are copied and shared widely, others are kept hidden away.
The crucial question for historians who want to understand the meaning of archives, then, is to understand how this record-making, record-keeping, record-destroying, record-editing and record-sharing was undertaken. Ethnomethodology is therefore useful for understanding the methods through which members of a social group -such as a company, an industry or a government department -decide what is recorded, and how, why, when and by whom.
Garfinkel's study of record-keeping practices in a clinic shows that records should not be seen as simply records of things that happened, but rather indications of the kinds of things their authors and users need them for, such as making (and sharing) inferences and decisions. 40 As a result, there may be 'good' organizational reasons for apparently 'bad' Organizations also actively 'create the past' by using records, such as corporate images, strategy documents or minutes of previous meetings. 41 The ethno-methods for studying the 'fossilization' of certain accounts into the organizational 'memory' would therefore also be a fruitful target for inquiry.
Meehan's ethnomethodological study of record-keeping practices by police officers showed that officers deliberately shared some records with other agencies, but deliberately withheld others, again for 'good organizational reasons'. 42 Some information contained in records was also deliberately designed to make it useless or unintelligible to outsiders, such as in court.
Moreover, the recording and categorisation of certain charges -required for official statistics of different types of crime to be generated -was also manipulated in order to maintain relationships with particular sections of the community, improve relationships with other 43 . In fact, some of Garfinkel's key insights arise from his studies of how numbers such as official statistics are generated 44 -a research programme now advanced by the field of study known as 'ethno-statistics'. 45 The value of an ethnomethodological history, then, lies in studying the ethno-methods through which 'official records' -whether written or numerical -are constructed.
Assembling the past: practical procedures
The task of the professional historian, as we noted above, is to piece together historical events through whatever records are at hand. However, other actors and groups are also 'practical historians': inquiry committees, lawyers, judges and juries, police officers, doctors, social workers, journalists, authors of biographies and auto-biographies, lay storytellers, and so on.
These actors have their own distinct ethno-methods for assembling histories of past events from memories, artefacts, oral traditions and written records, and also their own distinct practical purposes and goals. Two future research agendas will be discussed here simultaneously: studying how versions of the past are assembled from diverse records; and studying the practical tasks and decisions for which those histories are used.
Ethnomethodological studies of the criminal justice system -including the work of police officers, coroners, lawyers, judges and juries 46 -are particularly illuminating for historians because these professionals also routinely deal with records of past events and have to -by necessity -assemble them into a meaningful version (account) of what happened and why.
One of the key challenges faced by judges and historians alike is how to handle competing versions of the same past event. Pollner's study of traffic court judges offers a particularly rich theoretical resource. 47 Harrison's analysis of false accounting in the Soviet Union in the 1940s to 1960s offers a good case in point. 49 Soviet courts and party investigation committees clearly employed a range of ethno-methods to establish where false accounting has taken place in the production quotas and plans submitted by factory or farm directors. Yet we do not know, from
Harrison's analysis, what these methods were. Ethnomethodology therefore invites us to push
Harrison's analysis further: how did these courts and committees decide which of the many reported cases to investigate? How did they distinguish between 'petty' fraud and 'marginal' tinkering and more serious false accounting? How did they establish whether multiple consistent accounts were evidence of corroboration of facts, or collusion, concealment, bribery or intimidation? Addressing these questions would lead to significant insights into how historical events play out, including pivotal moments of business success and failure.
The case of the apparently 'falsified' prospectus produced to entice investment by Lord Meehan's study, discussed above, illustrates another crucial point 55 . Meehan showed how police officers used unofficial 'running records' to make sense of the appropriate actions for dealing with 'juvenile offenders'. These records were not 'officially' supposed to be used, and were only 'decipherable' by those knowledgeable in the police sub-culture and language, but were nonetheless regarded by officers as an authoritative source of information for making decisions -such as whether an arrested youth should be released without charge, cautioned or prosecuted.
Historians examining archives of these kinds of police records and medical records could easily 'miss' the practical meaning of such records that they had for their creators, and 'read in' a different meaning altogether. Medical records could be taken as a random series of medical notes, not a meaningful sequence in which it was the sequential placement, not the words themselves, which mattered most. Quotation marks could be understood as simply reports of what a patient said, not a display of professional scepticism. Similarly, a historian faced with the apparently 'meaningless' and 'unofficial' notes shared between police officers could easily put them to one side, and focus instead on the apparently more 'important' and 'official' records in each file. Hence, the reasoning procedures of the historian -how they reasoned which records were most 'reliable' (in the police officer's case), and what the record 'means' and 'tells us' (in the doctor's case) -need to be made explicit for others in the field to know (or perhaps even challenge) the 'readings' made by the researcher.
Our discussion of Lynch and Bogen's study has also showed us that it is not only the content of records that are used by historians ('professional' or 'practical') to assemble histories; it is also their very presence or absence. The absence of records that the Iran-Contra investigators expected to find was also subject to different 'patterns': was the absence of records to what procedures the historian used to make sense of the absence of a record (e.g. as evidence that the record was accidentally misplaced, deliberately removed or never created in the first place) can other scholars in the field have the opportunity to put forward alternative 'readings' of the same absence. These insights can also be used to inform pedagogy, to teach students of business history the methods through which histories are produced.
Letting go of the idea of a single, definitive and objective "truth", and following Hayden White in viewing history as a 'narrative' 57 , does not mean that 'anything goes' and any version of the past can, or should, be supported by the academic field. As ethnomethodology has shown, all social groups have their own more or less institutionalised procedures for deciding a version is to be treated as 'good enough for all practical purposes' and when to stop the process of deconstruction because it is time to 'settle' upon a version (or set of versions). This process could be enabled, we propose, by taking the often hidden and private reasoning procedures of business historians and making them public for other scholars to see and reflect upon. In contrast to Popp and Holt's idea that the intentions, thought-processes, motivations, strategies and objectives of actors can be "inferred through close textual readings", 58 we propose that business history can instead benefit from revealing how its scholars made those 'readings' in the first place. In short, what Lynch and Bogen have done for the 'practical historians' of the Iran-Contra committee, we propose can also be done for the 'professional historians' of the field of business history.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to develop a research agenda for business history that is informed by ethnomethodology's 're-specification' of sociology as a "science", in light of the plea by de Jong, Higgins and Driel to develop business history as a positive science underpinned by objective evidence-based theory development. 59 Ethnomethodology rejects the idea of studying society using the positivistic methods of natural science in favour of studying the underlying practical methods through which social facts are produced. For the field of business history, ethnomethodology directs us to studying the methods through which 'histories' are produced through the organization of diverse sources of evidence and inference about past events. 60 As such, this paper contributes to a wider body of work that seeks to move away from objectivist and empiricist approaches towards a social constructionist agenda that recognises the 'epistemological work' involved in the crafting of histories and sensemaking about the past. 61 In what follows, we will conclude by discussing how an ethnomethodological history can be taken forward in three ways: (a) as an empirical programme of research, (b) as a source of theory development, and (c) as a methodological resource for engaging in reflective practice.
As an empirical programme of research, ethnomethodological history invites empirical investigation into how, and to what practical purposes, history is produced and used by different actors in different settings. Recent work on the genre of corporate history in written texts 62 , interview-based studies of corporate historians 63 and ethnographic investigations of the use of history during periods of organizational change 64 illustrate how "history-in-action" could be studied empirically. Recent theoretical work on the role of history in institutional theory 65 , and the notion of corporate history as a strategic resource 66 , also provide fertile ground for theoretical connection with our argument here, particularly in relation to the argument that history is a "malleable construct" 67 that is both a medium and outcome of interpretative processes.
Ethnomethodology has informed some important theoretical advancements in business history already, even though it is rarely mentioned, through its intellectual influence on the field of science and technology studies, actor-network theory and performativity 68 , strategizing and strategic sensemaking 69 and the study of accounting and accountability 70 .
This literature has opened up the 'black box' of accounting, management and business to study how 'facts' of various kinds are assembled. Just as MacKensie seeks to develop 'ethnoaccountancy' to study the methods through which financial markets and accountancy calculations are assembled 71 , our aim here is to invite business historians to develop an ethnomethodological approach which studies how business histories are assembled.
Following Deidre Boden's contribution to organization studies and her approach to studying 'organization-in-action' 72 , we propose that a core contribution to business history can be made through explicating the practical actions (ethno-methods) through which versions of past events are worked up, worked on and eventually 'settled'. As ethnomethodology involves the study of how people "make sense" through the methodical deployment of 'reasoning procedures', the ethnomethodological history we propose here thereby offers a complementary (but distinct) framework which advances existing approaches to studying historical sensemaking founded in the social psychology of scholars such as Weick and the narrative approach of scholars such as White. 73 That said, much potential also exists for cross-fertilisation between these distinct approaches. Another fruitful avenue for future work lies at the interface between ethnomethodology and discourse analysis, to study how talk and text are employed in processes of meaning-making and practical reasoning. 74 What kinds of research methodology are appropriate for the ethnomethodological agenda we are advocating here? Ethnomethodology is not a research 'method' within sociology, akin to, say, using interviews or examining documents. However, it does have clear preferences for certain types of methods and certain types of data. Given its aim to recover and reveal the ethno-methods used in a particular setting, ethnomethodology has a strong preference for naturalistic data (that is, data collected from events and settings which would have occurred without the researcher being there), coupled with close observation of the setting, through ethnomethodologically-informed ethnography 75 and/or records of real-time interaction using audio-or video-recording. These methods are particularly useful for studying the work of 'strategic historians' of various kinds, such as senior managers who seek to remember, forget, invoke or suppress memories of the past strategically -to legitimate particular courses of action 76 , or corporate historians who create versions of the past strategically -to sell products, manage the corporation's public image or to motivate employees 77 .
Ethnomethodology rejects, and seeks to "re-specify", not only the kind of quantitative positivistic variables-and-outcomes types of methodology, based on sampling techniques and correlations between statistics of various kinds, as advocated by de Jong, Higgins and Driel, but also many forms of qualitative enquiry aimed at uncovering 'meanings' embedded in letters, diaries, artefacts and documents. By "re-specify" what is meant is to take the secondorder constructs generated by social scientists -which purport to 'improve' the theories that members themselves use by making them more sophisticated, more scientific or more complete -and replace them with a careful and detailed study of the first-order 'theories-inuse' that members themselves use to accomplish what they are doing. The reason is simple but powerful: if the theories produced by social scientists (e.g. Marxist theory, psychoanalysis, Foucauldian genealogy, post-colonial theory, and so on) are not the ones that members use, then they are not constitutive of, and consequential for, the setting itself.
Hence, an ethnomethodological history invites us to the theories-in-use deployed by historical actors -their assumptions about what exists in the world, and how various elements relate to one another -because it is these that make up the very phenomena we seek to study.
Pollner calls for a 'non-ironic' sociology 78 Moreover, as we have argued, ethnomethodology can also be 'turned on ourselves' to study the methods that we, as professional business historians, use to make official histories. As such, ethnomethodology invites a more reflective form of inquiry which reveals precisely how the business histories we produce were produced: not with a view to 'conceding' the influence of our own interpretive procedures in order to overcome the influence of 'subjectivity' and in so doing develop a more 'objective' historical science, but rather with a view to explicating the 'methodical' foundations of our field. John Nields and Oliver North, the White House National Security Council (NSC) staff member implicated in the scandal. According to Nields, the absent documents were shredded the day before the investigators' raid in a deliberate criminal act of evidence concealment. According to North, however, no such conspiracy took place, and shredding was undertaken as a routine matter and on a daily basis, and for legitimate motives: namely, protecting the interests of the country and its overseas agents. North also goes on to attribute a set of motives to his interrogators by accusing Nields and the whole committee of conducting a political "show-trial" designed to undermine the Republican party, create a convenient scapegoat, and put the security of the United States at risk.
In short, two versions of politics are in competition here:
(1) Nields version: North is lying about his knowledge of shredding the documents to protect himself (personal motive e.g. avoiding a jail-term) and/or others (party-political allegiances e.g. protecting the Republican party).
(2) North version: He is not lying; he cannot remember shredding because he shredded daily and routinely and for good reasons, and the interrogation itself is part of a political conspiracy to undermine public confidence in the President. to be treated as evidence of actual events that happened and which were 'faked' or 'planted', for reasons such as providing a 'decoy' and 'false lead' during covert military operations, or avoiding 'giving the game away' if classified documents should be leaked to 'enemy states'. Each document was methodically scrutinised, and witnesses interrogated, to assess its 'authenticity'. Once this process was underway, and certain documents were ratified as not-faked, or not-deliberately-misleading, these would then be used to ratify future documents through cross-referencing of dates, locations and persons, in an on-going process of 'working up' the facts-ofthe-matter.
For example, when presented with documents that stated he had authorised certain transactions, North produced an alternative 'reading' by claiming they were fakes designed to enable 'plausible deniability': the deliberate crafting of documents to enable officials such as the President to 'plausibly deny' knowledge of certain questionable (and possibly impeachable) activities. North used the 'plausible deniability' method to great effect, leaving much ambiguity and uncertainty about whether the supposedly 'cast iron' evidence of events was even evidence that those events had in fact taken place. Like the 'ironicising' that social scientists and historians often undertake when faced with versions produced by members, North also applied this same 'reasoning procedure'
here by claiming that documents do not 'literally' describe events that took place and actually conceal the real events, and thus should be treated 'ironically': 
